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Faculty and Deans

CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991

CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991. The Civil Rights
Act of 1991 stands as the most far-reaching and
controve rsial civil rights enactment since th e CIV IL.
RI( ; ~rrS ACT OF 1964. Ranging from racial harassment
to age discrimination to numerical proofs of discrimination (disparate impact) to attorney fees, th e 1991 act
covered most aspects of equal-e mployment legislation
and liti gation . The breadth of this legislation, not
surprisingly, bro ught with it sharp division s among
civil rights, business, and governm en tal interests. Most
significa nt , the Bush White Hou se strongly opposed
signifi ca nt features of th e legislative re form e ffortresultin g in a success ful veto of a 1990 civil ri ghts
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package a,nd marathon negotiations that preced ed the
Presid ent s eventual support of th e 1991 act.
The 1991 act was a matte r of great mom ent to th e
~ourts as well as ~o the Wh.ite Hou se and Co ngress.
fhrough thIs legislation , nme Suprerne Court d .. _
(d·d d f·
eCi
.
slons eCi e Tom 1986 to 1991) were either modified or re.versed . These d ecisions involved iss ues of
statutory mte rpre t~1tiOl? and, consequently , co uld be
ove~· t.urn ed by legislative enactm e nt. That so man y
deCISion s wer~ overturned , howeve r , signaled strong
dl:"pleasure With th e Supreme Court. Most significa nt,
of the sponsors act sought to clarify and ex pand the
sco~e and.s~eep. of Title Vll of the 1964 Civil Rights
~ct s. provIsions fo~ employment-discrimination litigation 111 the .w.ake of three controve rsial 1989 Supreme
Court d eCiSions. One d ecision , Price W alerhouse v.
Hopkins ( .198~) , h.e1~ th~t an employer who e ngages in
p~.rposet ul dlsc nmll1atlOn ca n nonetheless esca pe liability by provll1 g that motives not prohibited by Title
VIl wou~d have otherwise ca used the adverse e mployment action. A second d ecision, M arlin v. W ilks ( 1989),
held that pe~so n s not parties to liti gation ca n challenge
the terms of co urt-approved agreements betwee n d efe ndant employers and plaintiff employees . Th ird ,
and most significant, WaTds Cove v . Alonio (1989),
required a disparate-impact plaintiff to bear th e burd e n of persuasion ~oth in ide ntifying the challenged
employment practICe and d emonstratin g that th e
practice does not significantly se rve "the legitimate
employment goals" of the defe ndant em ployer. The
focus of the battle over the 1991 act was how these and
other Court d ecisions should be modified.
The battle proved to be an e pic, lasting twenty
months and includin g one preside ntial veto a nd
countless counterproposals and compromi ses. The
principal division centered on whether disparate-impact lawsuits would encourage employers to e ngage in
quota hiring in order to stave off costl y li tigation
rooted in num erical proofs of d isc rimination. Presid e nt Bush vowed that he would not sign a "quota bill"
and, in 1990, he vetoed proposed legislation for precisely this reason. Clairn in g in his veto message that
"the bill actually employs a maze of hi ghly legalistic
lan guage to introduce the d estructive force o f quotas
into our Nation's employm ent syste m" and that "[i]t is
neithe r fair nor se nsible to give th e e mploye rs of our
country a difficult choice betwee n using quotas and
see kin g a clarification of th e law th rough costly and
very r isky liti gation," Bush co nclud ed that "equ al opportunity is not advan ced but thwarted."
Bush's antiquota attack was su bject to doubt. Legislation that Bu sh se nt to Congress contem pora neous
with hi s veto was nea rly id entica l to th e legislation he
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vetoed on th e disparate-impact issue. On race-exclusive scholarsh ips, minority-business set-asides, and disparate-impact proof5 contained in the Americans with
Disabilities Act, moreover, Bush spoke of this longstanding commitment to AFF IR MATIVE ACT ION. The President,
nevertheless, was successful in his antiquota veto.
Bush pe rsisted in opposing the 1991 Civi l Rights Act
as "a quota bill. " Along with White House Counsel C.
Boyden Gray, Attorney Genera l Dick Thornburgh ,
and Chief of Staff John Sununu, the administration
fi e rcely opposed th e 199 1 act. A compromise was
eve ntually reached, howeve r. On th e rights of pe rsons
not. parties to litigation, th e avai labi lity of jury trials
and punitive damages, and several other iss ues, th e
Bush adm inistration acceded to congressional sponsors. On th e disparate-impact iss ue, the act was purposefully opaque. While noting that Supreme Court
d ecisions prior to the 1989 Wards Cove ruling would
become the governing standard, ambiguities in these
decisions mad e thi s a legislative compromise in wh ich
both sid es co uld hon estly proclaim victory . By not
es tablishing a definitive standard, moreover, the judiciary will have broad latitude to redefine disparateimpact proofs.
The willingn ess of Preside nt Bush to sign th e 1991
act is an outgrowth of events occurring in th e wee ks
be fore the announced compromise. Specifically,
form e r Ku Klux Klansman David Duke d e feated incumbent Governor Buddy Roemer as Louisiana's Republica n candidate for governor and, more signiticant, Clarence Thomas, Bush's choi ce to re place
Thurgood Marshall on th e Supreme Court, was subject to allegations of sex ual harass me nt. A veto of civil
rights legislation in the wak e of these events wou ld
have prove n difficult:, es pecially sin ce severa l moderate Re publicans notified Bush that th ey would not
support him in a veto-override fi ght.
The 199 1 act is a by-produ ct of compromise and
circumstances. The purpose ful ambig uity of critical
provisions, 1Il0reove r, reveals that t.wo years of negotiation cou ld not yie ld a d e finitive reso lution of the
con fli ctin g d esires of th e elected branches. Ironica ll y,
legislatioll spurred on by dissa tisfaction with Supreme
Court d ecisioll makin g will on ly beco me clear in th e
wake of judicial interpretation.
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